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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to examine the effect of business strategy of prospector and defender
companies on stock price crash risk, test the influenced of equity market competition on
stock price crash risk, and test the effect of prospector strategy on stock price crash risk
through overvalued equities. The population of this study was manufacturing firms listed
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for seven years of observation. The data analysis used
in this research was Path Analysis by using Multiple Linear Regression. The results of
this study that the business strategy prospector positively affect the stock price crash risk,
while the defender strategy was not affect the stock price crash risk. Companies that
implemented business prospector strategies will be faced with higher uncertainty than
defender business strategies. In addition, the prospector’s business strategy can affect the
stock price crash risk through overvalued equities. Companies that implemented busi-
ness prospector strategies will tend to overvalued equities, which can lead to future stock
price crashes. One way reduced to the stock price crash risk is in the presence of equity
market competition. The equity market competition had a negative effect on the stock
price crash risk, so that a high equity market competition can reduced information asym-
metry and minimize the stock price crash risk.
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh strategi bisnis perusahaan prospector dan
defender terhadap risiko crash harga saham, menguji pengaruh kompetisi pasar ekuitas terhadap
risiko crash saham, dan menguji pengaruh strategi bisnis prospector terhadap risiko crash
harga saham melalui overvalued equities. Populasi penelitian ini adalah perusahaan manufaktur
yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama tujuh tahun pengamatan. Analisis data yang
digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis jalur dengan menggunakan regresi linier berganda.
Hasil penelitian ini memberikan bukti empiris bahwa strategi bisnis prospector berpengaruh
positif terhadap risiko crash harga saham, sedangkan strategi bisnis defender tidak memengaruhi
risiko crash harga saham. Perusahaan yang menerapkan strategi bisnis prospector akan
menghadapi ketidakpastian yang lebih tinggi daripada strategi bisnis defender. Strategi bisnis
prospector dapat memengaruhi risiko crash harga saham melalui overvalued equities.
Perusahaan yang menerapkan strategi bisnis prospector akan cenderung mengalami overval-
ued equities, yang dapat menyebabkan crash harga saham di masa depan. Salah satu cara untuk
mengurangi risiko crash harga saham adalah dengan adanya kompetisi pasar ekuitas. Kompetisi
pasar ekuitas berpengaruh negatif terhadap risiko crash harga saham, sehingga kompetisi pasar
ekuitas yang tinggi dapat mengurangi asimetri informasi dan meminimalkan risiko crash harga
saham.
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Basically, capital market investors did not observe
the trend of stock price crashes, but observe stock
price created in the capital market. It has weak-
ness that stock price is not reflect the corporate
performance actually. The relatively high stock
prices can significantly decrease very quickly. It
can be due to some management efforts in delay-
ing informing bad news that can ultimately lead
to the stock price crash risk.
Risk stock price crashes as important issue
to analysis portfolio and determine price (asset
pricing) (Li, Steven, & Sue, 2016). Stock price crash
risk as a condition where stock prices declined
short period. Jin & Myers (2006) argued that the
crash risk is based on the concept that manager
has led to hold the bad news in few times, which
the bad news is not to be informed to the inves-
tor. When the bad news accumulates over the
threshold, the manager will inform it to the mar-
ket, which can cause increasing stock price signifi-
cantly.
There are several study showed that crash
risk can be happen because several factors such
as, research conducted by Hutton, Marcus, &
Tehranian (2009) stated that profit management
action which done by company aims to cover up
the bad news to investor to certain point, there-
fore, can be stock price specific crash risk. Kim, Li,
& Zhang (2011a) found that tax evasion can affect
the stock price crashes risk. Kim, Li, & Zhang
(2011b) showed that equity incentive between CFO
and CEO can affect stock price crash risk. Based
on the explanation above can be conclude that
profit management, tax evasion action, equity in-
centive, and business strategy also as a potentially
effect of stock price crash risk. For example, com-
panies those maintain future performance expec-
tations the investors who are too optimistic, will
apply an aggressive business strategy when the
company is involved in profit manipulation.
Recent research by Bentley, Omer, & Sharp
(2013) and Higgins, Omer, & Phillips, (2015) indi-
cates that business strategy which apply by com-
pany in order to keep it stable by delaying bad
news to some extent. It can be conclude that com-
pany business strategy the potential to have a first-
rate impact on the crash risk and lead direct eco-
nomic consequences for investors. Strict business
competition makes companies must have a busi-
ness strategy to develop business activity. Strat-
egy that used by company must suitable with com-
pany character and environmental conditions in
order to survive in a strict business competition.
Miles et al. (1978) explain that there are 4
business strategies that may exist simultaneously,
including business strategy prospector, defender,
reactor, and analyzers. It is based on the differ-
ence in magnitude and changes direction in prod-
ucts and markets (Hambrick, 1983). Prospector
typology does many changes in running the com-
pany. Defender typology runs his company with
a stable without doing much change. Reactor ty-
pology is a type of company that is more pressed
by the environment, because less attention to the
environment changes and the competition system.
Analyzer typology has a stable product market and
makes changes. This is shows the prospector’s com-
peting strategy and defender is a typology of strat-
egy that is at the opposite extreme point.
Company that implement prospector strat-
egy has higher uncertainty outcome level, which
can be asymmetry information level (Habib &
Hasan, 2017). Bentley, Newton, & Thompson
(2015) empirically, found that company manager
through prospector strategy tend to delaying the
bad news, because executive compensation struc-
ture (Rajagopalan, 1997), tend to tax evasion more
high (Higgins, Omer, & Philips, 2015), and litiga-
tion risk exposure. The research result explain that
tend to delaying the bad news related to prospec-
tor strategy makes more susceptible to the crash
risk.
The way to reduce stock price crash risk by
equity market competition. How the manager hide
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the bad news consistently, probably will decline
in the level of equity market competition. Inves-
tor may attempt to obtain personal information
by obtaining (negative) information were not dis-
closed by management. However, high trade costs
can reduce the incentive by reducing the present
value of informed investor trading. If a higher
competition level will lower the informed inves-
tors trading costs, thus increasing their willing-
ness to get personal information and trading. This
allows more information to be stored into stock
prices. Therefore, if higher market competition
level, the bad news possibility may lower and stock
price decreasing will lower too.
Stock price crash risk also can be happen by
overload equities. Conceptually the overload eq-
uities as a condition which company stock price
overload fundamental value (Jensen, 2005). Besides
that Jensen (2005) argue that overload equities may
create agency cost which directing the manager to
involved in value destruction activity. That action
can be over infestation through acquisition or ex-
pansion, fraud, and manage profit (Chi & Gupta,
2009). Overload like that, cause by much enthusi-
astic but unsustainable in long term. It made the
company was overload.
This study as development from Habib &
Hasan (2017) and Vorst (2016). This research con-
ducted on manufacturing company that listed to
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) 2010–2016. The
reason to choose that as research object is manu-
facturing company was included in the growing
industry and had great contribution on capital
market development. Manufacturing companies
are the industry groups whose shares are most
actively traded on the Indonesia Stock Exchange,
thus reflecting the overall reaction of the capital
market. Manufacturing companies also have the
largest number of companies in the IDX.
This study aims to analyse the effect of busi-
ness prospector strategy, defender business strat-
egy, and equity market competition to stock price
crash risk and the effect business prospector strat-
egy on stock price crash risk by overload equity.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Bad News Hoarding Theory
The theory of hoarding bad news comes
from the features of various strategic motivations
for good and bad information in the company. Jin
& Myers (2006) found consistently evidence re-
lated to the nature of agency problems that moti-
vated managers to control the strategy of disclos-
ing bad news about the company to the public. Jin
& Myers (2006) found that financial motives were
an important reason for managers to collect bad
news within the company. Ball (2009) showed that
non-financial motivation, such as maintaining the
company’s performance is so strong that can be
the main reason for hiding negative information.
Collectively, research by Jin & Myers (2006) and
Ball (2009) find that both financial and nonfinan-
cial motives as an important role for managers
enable to hold back bad news within the company.
Agency Cost of Overvalued Equity
Jensen (2005) conceptually states that over-
valuation equities is a condition where the com-
pany stock price exceeds its fundamental value.
Overvalued as it is often caused by excessive en-
thusiasm that is not sustainable in the long term
(Shiller, 2000). Its makes the company more over-
valued, the pressure to meet increasing the realis-
tic revenue targets becomes greater, thus forcing
manager to engage in profit manipulation to meet
or beat market expectations (Jensen, 2005). Costs
related to high overvalued equities, will be known
by market, that company overvaluation supported
by profit management and company stock price
becomes degenerated or may even cause a crash
(Jensen, 2005).
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Stock Price Crash Risk
Crash risk is the third moment of stock re-
turn that shows negative skewness, this is differ-
ent from the previous research other steps, such
as the average return (first moment), and the vari-
ant of the stock return (second moment) (Habib &
Hasan, 2017). According to Aman (2013), the stock
price crashes risk is a condition when stock prices
decline sharply in a relatively short time. Concep-
tually the risk of crashes is based on the idea that
managers have a tendency to hold bad news for
several time, so the bad news is not informed to
investors. When the accumulation of bad news
exceeds the threshold, managers will disclose the
information to the market at once, which can lead
to a large negative decline in stock prices (Jin &
Myers, 2006).
Type of Business Strategy
One of the determinants of corporate level
in the occurrence of crash risk is caused by busi-
ness strategy applied by individual companies.
Each company has a different type of business strat-
egy. Wheelen & Hunger (2012) argue the meaning
of strategy type, as follows “a strategic type is a
category of firms based on a common strategic
orientation of structure, culture, and processes
consistent with that strategy”.
Miles et al. (1978) classify appropriate typo-
logical strategies that may exist simultaneously in
an industry such as, prospectors, defender, ana-
lyzer, and reactor. The prospector strategy typol-
ogy focuses on product innovation, market oppor-
tunity, sales growth pursuit, and emphasizes its
competition through a unique product offering
(differentiation strategy). The defender strategy
typology focuses on market stability and offers,
and tries to protect a limited product for a nar-
row segment of a potential market. The analyzer
typology strategy tries to take the best of both
previous strategies. The reactor strategy typology
a simply reacts to environmental changes and is
characteristically less coherent so it cannot respond
quickly to environmental changes.
Equity Market Competition
The way to reduce stock price crash risk by
equity market competition. Stock prices will be
more informative when high equity market com-
petition. Higher levels of competition will lower
the informed investors trading costs, thus increas-
ing their willingness to obtain information and
private trades. This allows more information to
be confiscated into stock prices. Therefore, if the
level of equity market competition large, the pos-
sibility of bad news can accumulate lower and the
probability of a decline in stock prices is expected
to be lower as well (Vorst, 2016). How the man-
ager hide the bad news consistently, probably will
decline in the level of equity market competition.
Informative investor may attempt to obtain per-
sonal information by obtaining (negative) infor-
mation were not disclosed by management. How-
ever, high trade costs can reduce the incentive by
reducing the present value of informed investor
trading.
Overvalued Equities
Jensen (2005) explains that equity overvalu-
ation occurs when a company’s stock price is
higher than its underlying value. It means, com-
panies are not able to provide the financial per-
formance that the market needs to justify the as-
sessment. According to Jensen & Meckling (1976),
agency costs arise when an entity, principal em-
ploys an agent. They define agency costs as the
number of contracts, monitoring, and bonding
costs undertaken to reduce costs due to a conflict
of interest, residual cost, which occurs because it
is generally impossible to synchronize the agents
interests same as the principal’s interests. Jensen
(2005) stated that there is an expensive agency cost
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related to overvalued equities. Overvalued equi-
ties cause by much enthusiastic which unsustain-
able in long term.
The bad news hoarding theory explains that
managers have strategic motivation to hide and
accumulate bad news within the company. Habib
& Hasan (2017) argue that the stockpiling of bad
news causes the stock price crash risk. Prospec-
tors business strategy change their mix market
product quickly to become innovative market lead-
ers, while defender business strategies concentrate
on a narrow and stable product base to compete
on the basis of price, service or quality (Miles et
al., 1978). The tendency of prospectors to with-
stand bad news, and subsequent higher probabil-
ity of crash risk, can also be based on observa-
tions that prospectors suffer from higher levels of
information asymmetry compared to defender
counterparts (Kothari et al., 2009). It can be con-
cluded that prospectors are more likely to have
the future crashes risk. Based on the explanation
above, this research develops the following hy-
potheses:
H1a: the company prospector business strategy
has effect on the stock price crash risk
H1b: the company defender business strategy has
effect on the stock price crashes risk
If the investor is price taker, if investor trad-
ing does not affect stock prices, the market to be
perfectly competitive. If the number of investors
increases, the price impact of informed investor
trade will decrease, thereby reducing trade costs
and increasing their willingness to obtain and
trade personal information. As a result, the
manager’s ability to accumulate bad news signifi-
cantly in competitive equity markets is low, which
should manifest itself in the lower probability of
stock price decline. So the hypotheses of this study
as follows:
H2: equity market competition has effect on the
stock price crash risk
Jensen (2005) stated that overvalued theory
can be caused by a new agency cost type of over-
valued equities agency costs. Overvalued can cre-
ate huge welfare losses by reducing investor con-
fidence in capital market integrity and encourag-
ing cost-manipulation should by regulators. Ex-
cessively low equity also tends to produce ineffi-
cient results for contracts based on stock prices
(Beneish & Nichols, 2009). Habib & Hasan (2017)
argue that the prospectors’ business strategy will
tend to overvalued equity because there is evi-
dence to show that investors have optimistic ex-
pectations about the prospect for stock growth
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994; Skinner &
Sloan, 2002). Prospector business strategies are
considered more overvalued, companies will have
an incentive to withstand bad news to maintain
the overvalued. Based on the argument above this
research develops the following hypotheses:
H3: the company prospector business strategy
has effect on the stock price crash risk
through overvalued equities
METHODS
This research is included in type of correla-
tion research. This research uses independent vari-
ables in the form of business strategy that consists
of company prospector business strategy and com-
pany defender business strategy, and equity mar-
ket competition. Dependent variable tested is stock
price crash risk, beside that there is mediation
variable influence of prospector business strategy
on the stock price crash risk, that is overvalued
equities.
The population in this research is a manu-
facture company listed on the Indonesia Stock
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Exchange in 2010-2016. The selection of sampling
in this research is judgment sampling. This study
uses secondary data types that are quantitative in
the form of annual report and stock price data in
2010-2016. Annual reports are used to obtain re-
search variables related to stock price crashes risk,
business strategy, equity market competition, and
overvalued equities. Secondary data is collected
from various sources from the official website of
IDX, KSEEI, and Yahoo Finance.
Based on 854 observations, the company
listed on manufacture sector period 2010–2016,
data sample this research 224 companies.
Table 1. Research Sampling
KARPEN = KAR/PENJ (1)
PBV = MV/BV (2)
CETA = (CEt-Cet-1) / TAt-1 (3)
CEMVA = (CEt-Cet-1) / MVEt-1 (4)
Research by Habbe (2001) stated that Prin-
cipal Component Analysis consists of 3 values,
namely four indicator variables communalities,
eigen values for reduction of correlation matrix,
and correlation between factors with four indica-
tors. The value communalities summed had same
value with value (factor 1 + factor 2) from eigen
values. Factor 1 and factor 2 are indicators of rep-
resent variables CARPEN, PBV, CEMVE, and
CETA after being extracted with principal com-
ponent analysis. While fac_sum is the sum vari-
able of factor 1 and factor 2 score, which is index
to classify the company prospector typologi or
defender typologi. Prospector typologi or defender
typologi company determine based on second in-
dex sum (factor 1 + factor 2). Index sum (fac_sum)
then rated.
Equity market competition measure by num-
ber company investor by natural logaritma. This
measurement based on research by Armstrong et
al. (2011) and Vorst (2016). This research used 2
measurment which used for determined overvlued
equities such PE (Price to Earning) and PB (Price
to Book). Its based on research conducted by
Habib, Gong, & Hossain (2013). Selection of the
measurement is selected because it can assist in
terms of the company and the investor in detect-
ing the company’s equity condition overvalued or
not.
Data analisys in this research uses Path
Analisys by SPSS ver 20.0. Data analisys in this
research including descriptive statistics, regresi
robust test, hypotheses test, and path analisys
value.
Sampling Criteria  Amount 
Manufacture company listed on 
Indonesian Stock Exchange 2010–2016 
854 
Number of shares with accumulated losses 
on equity 
(210) 
The company statement with dollar 
currency 
(189) 
Companies that do not have 26 positive 
weekly returns 
(98) 
Unaudited financial statements (133) 
Research sampling number 224 
t+1 calculation for negative skewness (32) 
Number of final samples 192 
The stock price crash risk is the significant
decline risk in stock prices after prices have rise
(Kim & Zhang, 2012). This variable was measured
using a model developed by Chen, Hong, & Stein
(2001) with the following formula:
NCSKEWit+1 = - (n(n-1)3/2 ƴ:it+1)3 
   (n-1) (n-ƴ:it+12)3/2 
The company’s business strategy is a strat-
egy that companies use to adapt to a competitive
environment. The business strategy measurement
is based on the research of Habbe (2001) and
Kallapur & Trombley (1999). The indicator vari-
able from the prospector company proxy and de-
fender formulated as follows:
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RESULTS
Prospector Typologi and Defender Typologi
Company Selection
Table 2 shows the principal component
analysis results on four indicators or organizational
strategy proxy. In Table 2, it can be seen that the
communalities indicator value of organizational
strategy. Communalities are used to determine the
representational factors numberor indigenous vari-
ables that are shared with all the variables included
in the analysis. The fourth value of communalities
is 2.936. To achieve that value required 2 factors
that have eigen values above one, that is one 1.927
and factor two 1.009. This is suitable with the rule
of thumb that factor have equal eigenvalues or
more than one (Habbe, 2001).
Based on factor analysis was done, obtained
96 company implement prosoector strategy, and
96 company implement defender strategy from 192
company as research samples.
A. Communality of the four indicator variables 
Variable   KARPEN   PBV   CETA   CEMVE 
Communalities    0.532   0.479  0.962   0.963 
 
B. Eigenvalues for reduction of the correlation matrix 
Factor   1   2  3  4 
Eigenvalues   1.927   1.009              0.990    0.074 
 
C. Correlation between factors with four indicators 
Indicator   KARPEN   PBV  CETA  CEMVE 
Factor 1   -0.021   -0.021  0.979  0.981 
Factor 2    0.729   0.689  0.049  0.015 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
CRASH 
(NCSKEW) 
192 -0.76 0.98 -0.0005 0.25325 
STRATEGY 192 -1.46 14.04 0.0561 1.51038 
EMCOMP 192 2.53 2.62 2.554 0.03015 
PB 192 0.12 62.93 5.2774 10.1292 
PE 192 1.73 113 19.4281 14.4535 
Table 2. Principal Component Analysis Variable Indicator Strategy Organizational
Table 3. Statistics Descriptive
The average value of stock price crashes risk
by negative skewness measurement value or
CRASH is -0.0005 with deviation standard is
0.25325. Crash risk minimum value is -0.76 and
maximum value is 0.98. If the higher negative
skewness value will higher tendency of the com-
pany have stock price crash risk.
Business strategy measured by factor analy-
sis shows an average value is 0.0561 with a stan-
dard deviation is 1.510. Business strategy mini-
mum and maximum value -1.46 and 14.04. Higher
deviation standard value compared with average
value indicated that higher variation between
minimum and maximum value during the obser-
vation period that there is a large gap in the com-
pany business strategy variable.
Equity market competition (EMCOMP)
which measure by natural logaritma, number of
investor that listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange,
showed average value is 2.556 with standard de-
viation 0.030. Equity market competition minimum
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value is 2.53 and maximum value 2.62. If the higher
equity market competition value, will higher too
investor competition in capital market.
Overvalued equity variable measure through
2 measurement PB and PE. Overvalued equity
measurement through PBV showed the average
5.277 with deviation standard is 10.129. The aver-
age value indicates that the per share price of the
company has reached 5.277 equity per share.
Lower PB ratio is 0.12 and higher PB is 62.92. De-
viation standard PBV which higher than average
value indicates that high variation between mini-
mum and maximum value during observe period
that there is high gap in the overvalued equity
variables through PB measurement.
Overvalued equity variable measure
through PE indicates the average is 19.428 with
deviation standard is 14.453. It indicate that com-
pany per share price has reached 19.428 of profit
per share. Lower PB ratio is 1.73 and higher PB
ratio is 113.00. Lower PE standard deviation value
compare with average value indicate that low
variation between minimum and maximum dur-
ing observe period that there is no overvalued
equity variable high gap with PB measurement.
Robustness Standard Error Testing
The method to overcome outlier is robust
regression. Robust regression is regression method
used when residual distribution upnormal or con-
sist of outliers which influence to model. The aim
to use the robust regression to get robust best
model to outlier.
H1a stated that prospector strategy had the ef-
fect on stock price crash risk. Based on the
test is shown that prospector strategy vari-
able has significancy value is 0.032 (<0.05)
with coefficient regression is 0.022 and t is
2.174. So the H1a is accepted.
H1b stated that defender strategy had the effect
on stock price crash risk. Based on the test
is shown that defender strategy variable has
sicnificancy value 0.604 (>0.05) with regeres-
sion coefficient is -0.028 and t is -0.520. So
the H1b is rejected. Its indicate that defender
strategy has no effect on the stock price crash
risk.
Second hypotheses stated that equity mar-
ket competition had the effect on the stock price
Unstandardized Coefficient (B) T Sig R2 Information 
0.022 2.174 0.032 0.038 H1a accepted 
-0.028 -0.52 0.604 -0.008 H1b rejected 
Unstandardized Coefficient (B) t Sig R2 Information  
-3,654 -6,659 0,000 0,185 H2 accepted 
Table 4. First Hypotheses Test
Table 5. Second Hypotheses Test
Unstandardized Coefficient (B) t Sig R2 
0.499 5.586 0.000 0.241 
0.889 18.831 0.000 0.788 
Table 6. Prospector Strategy Business Testing on the Overvalued Equity
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crash risk. Based on test is shown that equity mar-
ket competition has sicnificant value is 0.000 (<0.05)
with regression coeffisien is -3.654 and t is -6.659.
So the H2 is accepted.
Third hyposthesis testing stated that the
prospector strategy effect on the stock price crash
risk through overvalued equity by sicnificant t and
coefficient in the regerssion model or equation 3.
In the regression model 3, coefficient regression
and t mediation variable by PB measurement are
0.002 and 2.431 with significance 0.017 (<0.05). That
result testing show that prospector business
styrategy had the effect on the stock price crash
risk through PB as a overvalued equity mesure-
ment. Beside that, regression coefficient and t
mediation variable through PE measurement are -
0.001 and -3.140 with sicnificancy 0.002 (<0.05). The
testing result show that prospector business strat-
egy had the effect on the stock price crash risk
through PE as overvalued equity measurement.
DISCUSSION
First hypotheses stated that prospector
strategy had the effect on stock price crash risk.
The testing result show that first hypotheses ac-
cepted. This result supported the previous research
by Habib & Hasan (2017), that the prospector strat-
egy tends to cause the stock price crash risk.
Company business strategy as a factor that
cause the stock price crash risk. According to re-
search by Miles et al. (1978) regarding company
business strategy, there are 4 company business
strategy. Business strategy type main focus in the
research by Miles et al. (1978) is about prospector
and defender business strategy. Prospector strat-
egy as a business strategy type which more focus
on the new product innovation, pursuit of market
growth, and emphasizing competition through
unique product offerings, so that with the com-
pany implementing the prospector business strat-
egy is more faced with higher uncertainty risk.
First hypotheses (b) stated that defender
strategy had the effect on stock price crash risk.
The testing result show that first hypotheses (b)
rejected. This study try to research whether de-
fender strategy had the same effect with prospec-
tor strategy. Based on test has been done, showed
that defender strategy has no sicnificant effect on
the stock price crash risk. This is due to defender
strategy focus on market stability and concern to
long term stability which limited the product type
produce by company, so the possibility stock price
crash risk in this strategy is low.
Second hypotheses stated that equity mar-
ket competition had the effect on the stock price
crash risk. The testing result show that second
hypotheses is accepted. This result supported the
previous result conducted by Chen, Hong, & Stein
(2001) and Vorst (2016), that equity market com-
petition tends to reduce the stock price crash risk.
Strong equity market competition can in-
crease the level where personal information re-
flected at stock price so that decrease manager
capability to hide the bad news, so there is no
possibility of a decrease in the lower stock prices.
According to research by Chen, Hong, & Stein
(2001), researchers found that an increase in stock
sales revenue, positively predicted crash risk and
negative return decline.
Unstandardized Coefficient (B) t Sig R2 Information 
0.264 
0.719 
2.613 
3.372 
0.010 
0.001 
0.074 
0.095 
H3 accepted (PB) 
H3 accepted (PE) 
0.218 
0.563 
2.160 
2.639 
0.033 
0.010 
0.074 
0.095 
H3 accepted (PB) 
H3 accepted (PE) 
Table 7. Strategy Business Testing on the Stock Price Crash Risk Through Overvalued Equity
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Third hypotheses stated that the prospector
strategy had effect on the stock price crash risk
through overvalued equity. The testing result show
that third hypotheses is accepted. This result sup-
ported the previous research by Habib & Hasan
(2017), showed that prospector business strategy
had effect on the stock price crash risk through
overvalued equity by PB and PE measurement.
The effect of overvalued equity on the stock
price crash risk related to theory by Jensen (2005)
stated that manager has incentive to extend
missevaluation through profit manipulation. Over-
valued equity increase investor expectation about
company future. Overvalued equity leads to op-
portunistic earnings management that can destroy
values and financial statements which can under-
mine the ability of the capital market to enter com-
pany-specific information gradually into stock
prices. The prospector business strategy is more
tends to overvalued equity due to investors’ opti-
mistic expectations about the prospect of stock
growth that could lead to stock price crashes
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994).
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
The results of this study provide empirical
evidence that the prospector business strategy is
one factor that can increase stock price crash risk,
while the defender strategy is not able to prove
that it has the effect on the stock price crash risk.
The results of this study also provide evidence that
the risk of stock price crash can be minimized with
the existence of equity market competition.
The result of this research is able to strengthen
bad news hoarding theory about the hoarding of
bad news can be minimized with the investor ac-
tivity in finding information that happened so as
to reduce asymmetry information between inves-
tor and company. The recent research result is to
provide evidence that the prospector business
strategy has an effect on the stock price crash risk
through overvalued equities. The research result
showed that the company that implement pros-
pector business strategy susceptible on the stock
price crash risk. This research also found that the
company implement the prospector business strat-
egy tend to overvalued equity which can cause
future the stock price crash risk.
Suggestions
The researcher still encounter some limi-
tations when doing the research. The limitation of
this research is a few manufacture company that
disclouse R&D cost, so that should the selection
of prospector and defender business strategy mea-
sures is based on previous research (Habib &
Hasan, 2017), in this research using the measure-
ment of business strategy referenced in research
by Habbe (2001) which used 4 indicators variable.
Other limitation, still lack of reference on risk
theory of stock price crash and agency cost of over-
valued equity theory, so the stock price crash risk
theory and agency cost of overvalued equity is
still very limited. Suggestion of this research is to
enlarge the research sample, for example not only
to the manufacture company so that might to get
business strategy indicator in the form of disclo-
sure of R&D cost (research & development).
Through this research is expected to be develop-
ment for further research, so that can be additional
reference about the stock price crash risk and
agency cost of overvalued equities.
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